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Abstract
This Article focuses on the changing role of consumers of financial services in the develop-
ment of financial services policy in the European Union (“EU”), illustrating tensions between two
models of supranational rule-making: the technical and the political. As the European mode of
governance has developed by claiming legitimacy largely through functional participation, it is
important to focus on the workings of functional participation, and whether it delivers the claimed
legitimacy. The first section of the Article describes in outline four different phases of financial
services related policy-making in Europe: the period before the Single European Act, the period
leading up to the 1993 deadline for development of the single market, and the more recent periods
between 1993 and the Financial Services Action Plan (”FSAP”) and the Lamfalussy Report and
the period since 2001. The second section then describes some of the changing features of the
rule-making process throughout the same period.
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INTRODUCTION
The European project of harmonization of the regulation
of financial services is an example of multi-level governance in
action.' This Article focuses on the changing role of consumers
2
of financial services in the development of financial services pol-
icy in the European Union ("EU"), illustrating tensions between
two models of supranational rule-making: the technical and the
political. As the European mode of governance' has developed
by claiming legitimacy largely through functional participation,4
it is important to focus on the workings of functional participa-
tion, and whether it delivers the claimed legitimacy.
The EU's5 internal market program involves the breaking
down of barriers between national markets and the construction
of a harmonized system of rules to regulate the regional market.
From the start, the fundamental treaty freedoms, free movement
of goods, persons, services and capital, together with competi-
tion law, were intended to further the interests of consumers.6
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1. See Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Unraveling the Central State, But How? Types of
Multi-Level Governance, 97 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 233, 234 (2003).
2. The term "consumers" is used in this Article to mean users and potential users
of financial services. It also includes the idea of consumer interest groups, which are an
element of "civil society" within the European Union ("EU"), and the most significant
element of civil society for the purposes of financial regulation.
3. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, European Governance: A
White Paper, COM (2001) 428 Final (July 2001) (discussing European Union govern-
ance).
4. See STIJN SMISMANs, LAw, LEGITIMACY, AND EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE 28 (2004) (ar-
guing that the White Paper on Governance placed functional participation "at the core
of the legitimacy debate").
5. In this Article, I commonly use the term "EU" to refer to the organization now
known as the European Union or EU, although this term only stricdy applies since the
coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.
6. See, e.g., STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY 4 (2005).
[T] he assumption of the original Treaty pattern is that the consumer will ben-
efit from the process of integration through the enjoyment of a more efficient
1212
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Even before the introduction of a specific treaty competence of
consumer protection, the European Community based the pro-
mulgation of rules to protect consumers on the imperative of
market integration.7 Financial services regulation is in part a
subset of consumer protection regulation.8 As the EU's rules
regulating financial services have developed over time, it has be-
come clear that some of the rules have a direct impact on con-
sumers' rights, whereas other rules have a more indirect impact
on consumers.
It is also clear that EU level rules on financial services in-
creasingly pre-empt the powers of the Member States to regulate
to protect consumers of financial services.9 There are two rea-
sons for this pre-emption. The first is that the volume and scope
of EU level regulation of financial services has increased dramat-
ically in recent years, and the second is that some EU measures
in this field are now maximum-standards measures rather than
minimum standards measures."0 As the EU institutions adopt
maximum harmonization measures, voters lose opportunities to
influence the development of policy at the domestic level. For a
long time, commentators on the European project have identi-
fied and critiqued a democratic deficit.11 However, as suprana-
tional rules take away policy-making power from the Member
market, which will yield more competition allowing wider choice, lower prices
and higher-quality products and services. The substantive provisions of the
Treaty ... are designed indirectly to improve the lot of the consumer. In this
sense, they are themselves instruments of consumer policy-but of an inex-
plicit, "hidden" type.
Id.
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, White Paper: Financial
Services Policy 2005-2010, COM (2005) 629 Final (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter Financial
Services Policy 2005-2010] ("The Commission will deploy the most open, transparent,
evidence-based policymaking based on a dual commitment to open consultation and
impact assessments, so to ensure sound rules are drawn up, adding value to the EU's
financial services sector and consumers.").
9. Cf FIN. SERVS. AUTH. ("FSA"), THE LISTING REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PROSPECrus DmEcrvE, CONSULTATIVE PAPER 04/16, 12, 2.6 (Oct. 2004), [hereinafter
FSA CONSULTATIVE PAPER], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp04_16.pdf
(noting that FSA was consulting in relation to areas where FSA had discretion in imple-
mentation of directive).
10. For an example of a maximum standards measure, see Council Directive No.
2003/71/EC, OJ. L 345/64 (2003).
11. See Shirley Williams, Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community, in
THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. DECISIONMAKING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 155, 162
(Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1991).
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States, the democratic deficit becomes ever more significant for
European citizens. The increasing significance of supranational
standard-setting and multi-level governance more generally has
led to discussions of the need for a global administrative law.1 2
The literature on global administrative law addresses the general
issue of an accountability deficit in supranational standard-set-
ting.13 As a result of these developments within the EU and be-
yond, it has become more important (at least as a political mat-
ter) to ensure that voters have opportunities to participate in the
development of policy at the supranational level. 4
The recent impetus towards a global administrative law re-
flects the idea that supranational rule-making, whether within re-
gional groupings such as the EU or international groupings,
tends to resemble domestic administrative rule-making, a tech-
nocratic process where the power to make detailed rules is dele-
gated to bodies with expertise in particular areas. 5 However,
unlike other supranational financial standard setting bodies
such as the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision,' 6 and
the International Organization of Securities Commissions
("IOSCO"), 17 the EU and its institutions are extensions of do-
12. See, e.g., B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch, & R. B. Stewart, The Emergence of GlobalAdmin-
istrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).
13. See, e.g., id. at 16 (noting "an accountability deficit in the growing exercise of
transnational regulatory power").
14. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Communicating Europe in Part-
nership, COM (2007) 569 Final, at 9 (Oct. 2007).
Many political decisions that have a significant impact on Europeans' day-to-
day lives are taken at European level. Policies which are seen to match the
expectations of citizens-whether on the internal market, climate change, sus-
tainable mobility, trade, energy policy, or migration-and which are based on
widespread consultation exercises are the best way of demonstrating the rele-
vance of the EU to its citizens.
Id.
15. Cf Christian Joerges &Jfirgen Neyer, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Delib-
erative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology, 3 EUR. LJ. 273, 277 (1997)
(discussing "the sophisticated model of 'regulation through committees' which, since
its very inception, was understood to be the European alternative to centralised regula-
tion through agencies on the one hand, and regulatory competition or mutual recogni-
tion on the other").
16. See J. BRAITHWAITE & P. DRAHos, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 104 (2000)
(describing the establishment of what is now the Basle Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion in response to the failures of the Herstaat Bank and Franklin National Bank in
1974).
17. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REv. 863, 878 (2006).
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mestic democratic politics. In contrast to the formally non-bind-
ing nature of the principles produced by the technocratic
processes of the Basle Committee and IOSCO, EU directives are
adopted by means of political processes which include the partic-
ipation of Members of the European Parliament ("MEPs")
elected by citizens, and, on adoption, they are binding on the
Member States. In addition, a larger proportion of the rules
promulgated by the EU institutions than of these other suprana-
tional bodies affects consumer interests directly.18
The acceptance by the EU institutions of the need to in-
crease the transparency and accountability of their rule-making
processes, and to ensure that consumers can participate effec-
tively in those processes is an important first step. The Commis-
sion has developed a number of initiatives to try to meet these
needs. Whether or not they will succeed is, as yet, uncertain.
The first section of the Article describes in outline four dif-
ferent phases of financial services related policy-making in Eu-
rope: the period before the Single European Act, the period
leading up to the 1993 deadline for development of the single
market, and the more recent periods between 1993 and the Fi-
nancial Services Action Plan ("FSAP")' 9 and the Lamfalussy Re-
port20 and the period since 2001. The second section then de-
scribes some of the changing features of the rule-making process
throughout the same period.
I. PHASES OF FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY
Between the establishment of the European Economic
Community ("EEC") and the early twenty-first century, the rate
of development and the volume of Europe-wide financial ser-
vices measures has increased dramatically. During the years of
eurosclerosis,2" the EEC did succeed in adopting some measures
18. The work of the Basle Committee focuses on developing standards for the
cross-border regulation of international banks as institutions, and on issues of safety
and soundness rather than on the retail activities of international banks.
19. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Com-
mission: Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM
(1999) 232 Final (May 1999).
20. FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN ON THE REGULATION OF EURO-
PEAN SECURITIES MARKETS (2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/se-
curities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men-en.pdf [hereinafter LAMFA-
LUSSY REPORT].
21. See Williams, supra note 11, at 157 ("Charges of Eurosclerosis damaged the
2008] 1215
1216 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.31:1212
which were designed to integrate the European financial mar-
kets. For example, in the early 1970s the Member States began
to co-ordinate their monetary policies. 22 The first banking direc-
tive, which was adopted in 1977,23 began to establish the condi-
tions under which banks would be able to carry on cross border
business in Europe.24 In this same period the Commission was
also addressing issues relating to securities markets25 and insur-
ance.
2 6
However, although a number of measures were adopted
during the 1970s to address the need to integrate Europe's mar-
kets, little concrete progress was achieved in the early years of
the EEC. By the mid-1980s, the European Parliament,27 the Eu-
ropean Council, and the Commission began to take steps to try
to complete the European internal market.28 The Single Euro-
pean Act provided for a new procedural basis for achieving this
internal market.29 The new internal market initiative substituted
Community's image as a market worth investing in and as the inspiration for a renewal
of Western Europe.").
22. See, e.g., Roger J. Goebel, European Economic and Monetary Union: Will the Emu
Ever Fly?, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 257 (1998).
23. Council Directive No. 77/780, OJ. L 322/30 (1977) (on the coordination of
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit
of the business of credit institutions).
24. See Council Directive No. 737183, OJ. L 194/1 (1973) (on the abolition of
restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services in respect of
self-employed activities of banks and other financial institutions).
25. See Council Directive No. 80/390, OJ. L 100/1 (1980) (coordinating the re-
quirements for the drawing up, scrutiny and distribution of the listing particulars to be
published for the admission of securities to official stock exchange listing); Council
Directive No. 79/279, OJ. L 66/21 (1979) (coordinating the conditions for the admis-
sion of securities to official stock exchange listing); Commission Recommendation No.
77/534, O.J. L 212/37 (1977) (concerning a European code of conduct relating to
transactions in transferable securities).
26. See Council Directive No. 73/239, O.J. L 228/3 (1973) (on the coordination of
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of
the business of direct insurance other than life assurance); Council Directive No. 73/
240, OJ. SPEC. ED. 228/20 (1973) (abolishing restrictions on freedom of establishment
in the business of direct insurance other than life assurance).
27. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 11, at 157.
28. See, e.g., id. at 162; see also Commission of the European Communities, Com-
pleting the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Coun-
cil, COM (85) 310 Final (June 1985).
29. See Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1, at 7 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741
[hereinafter SEA] (amending Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11); Andrew Moravcsik, Negotiating the Single European Act,
in THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY- DECISIONMAKING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra
note 11, at 41; see also Juliet Lodge, The Single European Act: Toward a New Euro-Dyna-
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the ideas of mutual recognition and minimum standards for
traditional detailed harmonization measures.3" By 1989, George
Zavvos described the Community's policy in banking law as hav-
ing "three fundamental features: the harmonization of banking
regulation, the mutual recognition of financial standards, and
the home country control principle. " "
Although the Second Banking Directive was adopted in
1989, before the original 1993 deadline for achievement of the
single internal market, the Investment Services Directive, which
included similar provisions for securities firms, was not adopted
until 1993.32 A capital adequacy directive, which applied to
banks and securities firms was also adopted in 1993. It took
more time for the Member States to reach agreement on the
content of these measures than the Commission had hoped.
Mutual recognition on the basis of minimum harmonized
standards was designed to achieve a situation where a financial
firm established in one Member State (its home State) would be
allowed to supply services in other Member States and even es-
tablish offices in other Member States on the basis of its home
State authorization to carry on business subject to home State
rules. However, the usefulness of the mutual recognition princi-
ple was limited in a number of ways. Member States did not al-
ways implement the internal market directives properly. 34 And,
mism?, 24 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 203 (1986). Commentators noted that businesses
seemed to support the new initiative, and that consumers and labor groups were also
generally positive. See, e.g., Jacques Pelkmans & Peter Robson, The Aspirations of the White
Paper, 25J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 181, 184 (1987).
30. See, e.g., Moravcsik, supra note 29, at 41.
31. George Zavvos, Doing Business in the European Internal Market: Banking Integra-
tion in the European Community, 9 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 572, 573 (1989); see also Council
Directive No. 89/646, O.J. L 386/1 (1989) (on the coordination of laws, regulations
and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of
credit institutions and amending Directive 77/780/EEC).
32. See Council Directive No. 93/22, O.J. L 141/27 (1993) (on investment services
in the securities field). Article 31 of the directive required the Member States to adopt
implementing measures byJuly 1, 1995, and stated that those measures must come into
force by December 31, 1995. See id.; see also Mads Andenas, Insurance and Banking, 43
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 728, 728 (1994) (noting the adoption of the Investment Services
Directive after the original single market deadline).
33. Council Directive No. 93/6, O.J. L 141/1 (1993) (on the capital adequacy of
investments firms and credit institutions). Article 12 of this directive provided that it
was to be implemented by the Member States on the same schedule as the Investment
Services Directive. See id.
34. For example, by 1997 the Commission stated: "Only 65% of Single Market
directives are fully operational in all 15 Member States. The Single Market clearly can-
12172008]
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more fundamentally, the directives failed to go far enough to
achieve market integration.35 Generally the second generation
of financial services directives retained provisions allowing host
Member States to apply some of their own rules to financial
firms from other Member States. 6 The Investment Services Di-
rective did nothing to harmonize conduct of business rules for
securities firms. 7 At this point in the development of the inter-
nal market, consumer protection was often seen as a matter for
the Member States.3"
Between the early 1990s, when it was clear that a number of
Member States remained reluctant to open their national finan-
cial markets to competition from firms established in other
Member States," and the early 21st century, much has changed,
in the markets,4 ° and in the European regulatory sphere. Over
not function optimally in these conditions." Commission of the European Council,
Action Plan for the Single Market, CSE (97) 1 Final, at 3 (June 1997) [hereinafter
Action Plan]. Although the situation has improved, non-implementation of directives is
still an issue. See Commission Recommendation No. 2005/309, O.J. L 98/47 (2005) (on
the transposition into national law of Directives affecting the internal market).
35. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, European Financial Inte-
gration Report 2007: Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2007) 1696, at 8,
§ 2(1) (Dec. 2007) [hereinafter EFIR].
There is no widely accepted definition of financial integration. Generally a
perfectly integrated market is regarded as a market where prices for similar
products and services converge across geographical borders and where supply
and demand can react immediately to cross-border price differences. An inte-
grated market should enable all market participants (consumers, financial in-
stitutions, etc.) to buy and sell financial instruments and/or services, which
share the same characteristics, under the same conditions, regardless of the
location of origin of the participant. If the latter is the case, this should result
in more opportunities for risk diversification, better allocation of capital, and
higher economic growth.
Id.
36. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, 1992: The Case of Financial Services, 12 Nw.J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 124, 142-50 (1991); Niamh Moloney, New Frontiers in EC Capital Markets Law:
From Market Construction to Market Regulation, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 809, 810 (2003).
37. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 36, at 151-52.
38. Although consumer protection measures had previously been justified by the
need to achieve a common market, it was not until the Maastricht Treaty, which came
into force in 1993, that specific treaty provisions empowered the European Community
to act in the field of consumer protection. See WEATHERILL, supra note 6, at 2, 15-19.
Consumer protection is one of the areas of the general good which the Member States
are entitled to act to protect, absent harmonization. See, e.g., Commission v. Federal
Republic of Germany, Case 205/84, [1986] E.C.R. 3755.
39. See, e.g., Daniel Mfigge, Reordering the Marketplace: Competition Politics in Euro-
pean Finance, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 991, 992 (2006).
40. See id. at 1008-11.
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this period, and building on decisions of the European Court of
Justice, the Commission identified what it saw as the legal limits
on the powers of the Member States to apply their own "general
good" rules to financial firms authorized in other Member
States.4 ' The Commission also attempted to build on prior di-
rectives and achieve greater levels of integration, overcoming
the reluctance of the Member States to agree on harmonization
measures. 
42
By the late 1990s the Commission acknowledged that the
people of Europe were not obtaining all of the benefits they
could expect from a single European market.43  In 1998 the
Commission wrote that Europe was "still a long way from achiev-
41. See, e.g., Commission Interpretative Communication, O.J. C 43/5 (Feb. 16,
2000) (to Member States on the Freedom to provide services and the general good in
the insurance sector). For example, the Commission referred to the following cases in
this document: Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83,
[1984] E.C.R. 377; Sdgerv. Dennemeger & Co. Ltd., Case C-76/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-195;
Alpine Investments BU v. Minister van Financiin, C-384/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-1141. See
Commission Interpretive Communication, supra, at 7 (2000); see also Commission Inter-
pretative Communication, Freedom to Provide Services and the Interest of the General
Good in the Second Banking Directive, SEC (97) 1193 Final, at 25-26 (June 1997). In
moving forward the single market project, the Commission saw the role of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice ("ECJ") as significant. See Commission of the European Commu-
nities, First Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
on the implementation of the Commission's White Paper on completing the internal
market, COM (86) 300 Final, at 16 (May 1986).
On financial services and securities, the Council has adopted the two propos-
als on UCITS scheduled for 1985. Viewed overall therefore, the White Paper
programme for liberalisation in this sector is well-advanced. Two Council de-
cisions are foreseen in 1986, namely on own funds and the directive to facili-
tate freedom to provide services in the field of non-life insurance. A ruling by
the Court ofJustice, expected this summer, is likely to lend a decisive impetus
to progress in this field.
Id.
42. See, e.g., Communication of the Commission, Financial Services: Implement-
ing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232, at 21-31 (May
1999) [hereinafter FSAP].
43. See Action Plan, supra note 34, at 1
The Single Market is not simply an economic structure. At its heart are 370
million people seeking better employment opportunities, improved living and
working conditions, and a wider choice of quality products and services-in-
cluding access for everyone to services of general interest-at lower prices.
The Single Market is working in their interests. Much has already been
achieved. Individuals already enjoy the right to move and work throughout
the Union. The Single Market sets basic standards of health and safety, equal
opportunities and labour law. However, more needs to be done to enforce
these rights effectively.
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ing the potential benefits of the Single Market in financial ser-
vices."" In particular, the Commission noted that the market in
consumer financial services was not fully integrated.45 Consum-
ers were important for the Commission not just because they
would be beneficiaries of market integration, but because " [i] t is
as consumers that citizens will above all judge the success of the
Internal Market."
46
The Commission published its Financial Services Action
Plan ("FSAP") in 1999, identifying key areas for further harmoni-
zation, 47 including integration of retail markets, which was iden-
tified as a priority.48 The FSAP also proposed "a more wide-rang-
ing rethink of the way in which policy for financial markets is
processed."49 The Economic and Financial Affairs Council
("ECOFIN Council") appointed a Committee of Wise Men, led
by Baron Lamfalussy, to rethink the EU's processes for develop-
ing financial policy, and this committee proposed a new system
which would distinguish framework measures and detailed im-
plementing rules.5" In principle, the detailed implementing
rules could be amended more easily than the framework mea-
sures and this ease of amendment would ensure that the rules
could adjust to changing circumstances.51 The Committee also
emphasized the need for cooperation between national regula-
44. Commission of the European Communities, Financial Services: Building a
Framework for Action, COM (98) 625 Final, (Oct. 1998), available at http://ec.europa.
eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/fs_en.pdf.
45. See id. ("There is therefore a need to find pragmatic ways of reconciling the
aim of enhancing consumer confidence by promoting full financial market integration
while ensuring high levels of consumer protection.").
46. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The Strategy for Europe's
Internal Market, COM (1999) 464, at 10 (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter Strategy for Europe's
Internal Market].
47. See generally FSAP, supra note 42.
48. See id. at 9, 26-27.
49. Id. at 17.
50. See ILAmFALUSSY REPORT, supra note 20, at 19-20.
51. See id. at 20.
The two layers should be efficient, in the sense of achieving the stated objec-
tives with the lowest cost in terms of regulatory burden; they should aim at
establishing a level playing field, by removing any opportunity to erect regula-
tory barriers to competition; they should help speedy implementation and be
flexible, so that they can be quickly adapted to the rapid pace of technical
changes and product innovation in the financial markets.
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tors and for more effective enforcement of Community law.5 2
Although the EU has adopted a number of financial services
directives since the Lamfalussy Report, the process is still not al-
ways rapid. For example, the Market for Financial Instruments
Directive ("MiFID"), 53 which replaces the Investment Services
Directive, was adopted in 2004, three and a half years after the
Commission proposed the replacement.5 4 The Directive came
into force in November 2007."5
Increasingly, financial services directives constrain the abil-
ity of the Member States to impose stricter rules than those es-
tablished in directives. These constraints exist both as a formal
matter and as a practical necessity. Whereas the Second Bank-
ing Directive and the Investment Services Directive were mini-
mum standards measures, establishing baseline regulatory stan-
dards, some more recent directives establish maximum regula-
tory standards. 6 However, even where the text of EU measures
allows the Member States some discretion in implementation,
market participants have argued that the Member States should
not use that discretion to promulgate "gold-plated" rules which
would interfere with market integration.57 In response to such
arguments, the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority
has agreed to adopt "intelligent copy-out" as its general ap-
52. Id. at 19.
53. Council Directive No. 2004/39, O.J. L 145/1 (2004) (on markets in financial
instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council
Directive 93/22/EEC).
54. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Com-
mission to the European Parliament and the Council: Upgrading the Investment Ser-
vices Directive, COM (2000) 729 Final, at 3-4, (Nov. 2000). The proposed directive was
not published until 2002. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Investment Services and
Regulated Markets, and Amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC, Council Directive
93/6/EEC and European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC, COM (2002)
625 Final, at 7 (Nov. 2002).
55. Commission Press Release, IP/07/1625 (Oct. 29, 2007).
56. See, e.g., FSA CONSULTATIVE PAPER, supra note 9, at 12, 2.6 (describing the
Prospectus directive as a maximum harmonization measure); see also Council Directive
No. 2003/71, O.J. L 345/64, at 68 (2003) (describing the purpose of the Directive as
harmonization).
57. The Commission has recognized this concern. See, e.g., Financial Services Pol-
icy 2005-2010, supra note 8, at 5 ("The Commission will work intensively with Member
States to monitor progress, ensure accurate implementation and avoid regulatory addi-
tions, so-called 'goldplating.'").
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proach to the implementation of EU directives."
Fifty years after the initiation of the European project, sub-
stantial progress has been achieved in integrating European fi-
nancial markets at the wholesale level. 9 It is, however, clear that
consumers and retail markets are still resistant to integration.60
Differences in regulation impede cross-border banking business
at the retail level,61 and have led the Commission to focus on the
integration of retail financial services. 6 2 For example, in late
2007 the Commission published a White Paper on mortgage
markets. 63 In November 2007 the Council and the Parliament
adopted a new directive on payment services.64 Retail financial
services is one of the areas the Commission proposes to focus on
58. See, e.g., FSA, BETrER REGULATION ACTION PLAN 6 (2005), available at http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/better -regulation.pdf ("Our basic approach is to 'copy
out' the text in our Handbook, adding interpretive guidance where that will be helpful.
This avoids placing unintended additional obligations on firms. We will not gold-plate
EU requirements. We will only add additional requirements when these are justified in
their own right.") [hereinafter BETTER REGULATION ACTION PLAN].
59. See, e.g., EUR. CENT. BANK, FINACIAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 11 (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialintegrationineurope2007O3en.pdf
[hereinafter EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK]
The unsecured money market became fully integrated shortly after the intro-
duction of the euro. The repo market is, in terms of pricing, also highly inte-
grated, with the full integration of the LVPS instrumental in achieving this
result. Government bond markets became largely integrated in the run-up to
EMU. In similar fashion, the corporate bond market received a major boost
with the introduction of the euro and has since achieved a high degree of
integration.
Id.
60. Id. ("[E]uro area banking markets, and in particular the retail banking mar-
kets continue to be rather fragmented. The lack of integration in retail banking mar-
kets is mirrored by a fragmented retail payments infrastructure."). Although there is
competition in national mortgage markets there is not much cross-border competition.
See id. at 11; see also EFIR, supra note 35, at 42 ("The lack of integration of retail finan-
cial markets is reflected in significant price variations and relatively low volume of cross-
border transactions. This is due to cultural and consumer preferences, which may im-
ply that retail markets will predominantly remain local, but also to differences in regula-
tory frameworks.").
61. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 59, at 38.
62. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Retail
Financial Services in the Single Market, COM (2007) 226 Final (Apr. 2007). The Com-
mission has also sought to acquire data on the retail financial services market. See, e.g.,
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission:
Sector Inquiry under Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on retail banking (Final
Report), COM (2007) 33 Final (Jan. 2007).
63. Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on the Integration of
EU Mortgage Markets, COM (2007) 807 Final (Dec. 2007).
64. Council Directive No. 2007/64/EC, OJ. L 319/1 (2007) (on payment services
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as part of its consumer scoreboard initiative.65 Despite such de-
velopments, some national regulators and market participants
argue that national discretion is more important in the context
of retail markets than in the wholesale markets.66 In a recent
response 67 to the Commission's call for evidence on the regula-
tion of "substitute" investment products,6" the Joint Associations
Committee69 stated:
Not only are national regulators best placed to understand
in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and
2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC).
65. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the
Commission: Monitoring Consumer Outcomes in the Single Market: The Consumer
Markets Scoreboard, COM (2008) 31 Final, at 5 (Jan. 2008) [hereinafter Consumer
Markets Scoreboard] ("The ability of consumers to understand the choices available in
the market affects the successful functioning of the market, even if the operators are
transparent and truthful. Assessing complex products such as life insurance or high
technology equipment may require professional advice.").
66. See, e.g., FSA, STRENGTHENING THE EU REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY FRAME-
WORK: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 5-6 (2007) available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
media/4/0/fin_lamfaulssyO7ll07.pdf
Nevertheless, differences in national markets mean supervisors will often need
to adopt different approaches and apply different tools in their daily work.
For example, the appropriate regulatory approach for international financial
centres dominated by wholesale markets is clearly different to the appropriate
approach for more retail focused national markets in the EU.
Rather the UK authorities believe that consistent with a principles-based ap-
proach, supervisory convergence is primarily about delivering equivalent regu-
latory outcomes. Over time and through ongoing cooperation and sharing of
best practice, it is likely and desirable that supervisory practices converge.
However this needs to be part of an organic process, rather than one that is
regulated into effect.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
67. See Letter from Joint Associations Committee to European Commission, (Jan.
18, 2007), available at http://www.isda.org/whatsnew/pdf/080118-JAC-Call-response.
pdf [hereinafter Joint Associations Committee].
68. See generally COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, CALL FOR EVIDENCE:
NEED FOR A COHERENT APPROACH TO PRODUCT TRANSPARENCY AND DISTRIBUTION RE-
QUIREMENTS FOR "SUBSTITUTE" RETAIL INVESTMENT PRODUCTS? DG MARKT-G4 (2007),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/finances/docs/cross-sector/
call-en.pdf. The CallforEvidence invites views about the sectoral fragmentation of finan-
cial regulation in a context of blurred distinctions between investment products. See,
e.g., id. at 3 ("This call for evidence focuses on whether this fragmented regulatory
landscape leads to unacceptably high variations in the level of product disclosure and
investor protection, depending on the regulatory status of the investment product.").
69. TheJoint Associations Committee describes itself as being "sponsored by: Eu-
ropean Securitisation Forum (ESF), International Capital Market Association (ICMA),
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), London Investment Banking
Association (LIBA) and Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(SIFMA)." Joint Associations Committee, supra note 67, at 1 n.1.
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and respond to developments in their local markets, they are
also best placed to judge the type of regulatory intervention
most likely to be effective in addressing a particular local mar-
ket issue. Thus, effective regulation in this area must leave
scope for national regulators to act in their local markets.
Conversely, the imposition of Europe-wide regulation at a de-
tailed level, if not precisely calibrated, could result in signifi-
cant customer detriment in some national markets. Put sim-
ply, we doubt whether it would be possible to create a Eu-
rope-wide regime in this area capable of addressing the
vagaries of all of the EU national retail financial markets.
70
In its resolution on financial services policy adopted in July
2007, the European Parliament expressed similar reservations
about retail market harmonization.71
This brief and partial description illustrates the changing
strategies for harmonizing European financial services regula-
tion, from detailed harmonization to minimum standards and
mutual recognition to indications of a more complex mix of dif-
ferent regulatory strategies for different contexts (including reg-
ulation through committees) 72 For example, there may be dif-
ferent levels of harmonization in different areas; some measures
set maximum standards and others do not. For the future, there
are visible tensions in financial services policy in the EU. The
Commission continues to track the state of financial integration
in the EU. 7' However, it is clear that integration is not an unal-
loyed good, as it can have a negative impact on market stability.74
The fallout of the U.S. sub-prime lending crisis, which has had
an impact on European markets as well as in the United States,
illustrates that it is not a simple matter to separate wholesale and
retail financial markets.7 ' There is some resistance to the idea of
70. Id. at 3.
71. See European Parliament Resolution on financial services policy (2005-2010)-
White Paper, OJ. L 2006/2270 (2007) ("warns, however, against simply overhauling the
national consumer protection traditions and legal systems by one-size-fits-all harmonisa-
tion.").
72. The committee system for financial services is briefly described below.
73. See generally EFIR, supra note 35.
74. See, e.g., id. at 37 ("the market links do not only contribute to risk diversifica-
tion but may also serve as channels for cross-border contagion, transmitting risks across
the financial system.").
75. When sub-prime borrowers whose loans had been packaged through securi-
tizations defaulted on their loans, investors generally lost confidence in structured
credit investments and the credit markets suffered. See, e.g., Ingo Fender & Peter
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general harmonization of retail regulation. Some European fi-
nancial services regulators have adopted a commitment to Better
Regulation,76 which would tend to limit the volume of regulation
for the future. Although the Commission has also stated its sup-
port for Better Regulation, 7 some doubt whether this support
will have a noticeable impact on the Commission's behavior in
the near future." In the context of consumer policy generally,
but including financial services, the Commission suggests that it
interprets the Better Regulation agenda as requiring serious pro-
tection of consumer interests, by focusing on outcomes.7 9
At least to the extent that EU level measures are proposed
to harmonize retail regulation, European consumers, and the or-
ganizations which represent their interests, have an interest in
the content of those measures. The following section of this Ar-
ticle examines the mechanisms for consumers to participate in
the processes which produce the harmonized rules which will
affect them.
II. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU
The original vision of the European Economic Community
H6rdahl, Overview: Credit Retrenchment Triggers Liquidity Squeeze, BIS Q. REV., at 1, 1
(Sept. 2007).
76. See BETTER REGULATION ACTION PL-AN, supra note 58; see also AUTORITt DES
MARCHfS FINANCIERS, PROMOTING BETrER REGULATION (2006), available at http://
www.amf-france.org/documents/general/7235-1 .pdf.
77. See, e.g., Financial Services Policy 2005-2010, supra note 8, at 4.
78. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE, EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SER-
VICES REGULATION: SEVENTH REPORT OF SESSION, 2005-06, H.C. 778, at 10.
A change in the working culture at the Commission towards more proportion-
ate, risk-based, policy making will not happen immediately. We welcome
Commissioner McCreevy's assurances that the Commission will prove that new
regulation will have a clear benefit to the European economy. It is essential
that European policymakers ask and receive answers to the simple questions
that McCreevy is posing: Is there a case for action? Is it the EU that is best
placed to act? Is a regulatory proposal the only possible solution? To ensure
growth and competitiveness in the European financial services industry, the
Commission must now deliver on its promise to ensure better regulation prin-
ciples are followed in its policymaking.
Id.
79. See Consumer Markets Scoreboard, supra note 65, at 10 ("The shift in poli-
cymaking away from an instrument-led approach to an outcome-led approach with a
focus on consumer outcomes is ambitious and calls for an important change in the
work of policymakers .... The prize is both better, simpler regulation and markets
which better deliver what citizens want.").
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included representatives of civil society in the process of rule-
making through the participation of the European Economic
and Social Committee ("EESC") as a consultative body. The Ec-
onomic and Social Committee includes representatives of con-
sumers. The European Parliament, which was originally a purely
consultative body, is now a co-legislator with the Council, and its
members are directly elected by European citizens. Thus, as a
formal matter, the interests of consumers are represented in the
EU's rule-making processes as constituents of MEPs and through
the EESC.
Although the original design for the European institutions
did not provide for a system of delegated rule-making, over time
an increasing number of issues came to be addressed through
the comitology process.80 The Lamfalussy distinction between
framework directives and detailed implementing rules81 led to
the establishment of a number of committees with responsibili-
ties for helping to develop the detailed rules to implement
framework directives, and for advising on the development of
policy.8 2
The delegation of rule-making powers with respect to finan-
cial services to the Commission, with the assistance and advice of
specialized committees brings the more general debate about
the comitology system into the area of financial services policy.
Thus, the call for representation of a wider range of interests
within the EU's administrative processes 3 also applies in the fi-
80. See Joerges & Neyer, supra note 15, at 275 (noting the development of the
committee system in the context of the CAP and its expansion as a result of the Single
European Act).
81. See generally LAMFALUSSy REPORT, supra note 20.
82. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 2004/8/EC, O.J. L 3/33 (2004) (amending
Decision 2001/528/EC establishing the European Securities Committee); Commission
Decision No. 2004/10/EC, O.J. L 3/36 (2004) (establishing the European Banking
Committee; Commission Decision 2004/7/EC, Oj. L 3/32 (2004); (amending Deci-
sion 2001/527/EC establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators);
Commission Decision No. 2004/6/EC, O.J. L 3/30 (2004) (establishing the Committee
of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors); Commission Decision
No. 2004/5/EC, O.J. L 3/28 (2004) (establishing the Committee of European Banking
Supervisors).
83. See, e.g., Michelle Everson, Administering Europe?, 36 J. COMMON MKT. STUD.
195, 196 (1998)
EU administrative law.., must at last acknowledge that the legal oversight of
administration is less a case of safeguarding the narrow execution of legislative
mandates, and more one of ensuring the fair representation of a wide range of
interests within ongoing political processes. Similarly, it must go much fur-
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nancial services sector.8 4 The Parliament has a role here, and a
2005 directive recognizes this, stating that "[d]emocratic ac-
countability and transparency must be inherent in the Lamfa-
lussy process."8 5 The same directive sets out a number of princi-
ples the Commission should respect in exercising its implement-
ing powers, including "the need for high levels of transparency
and consultation with all market participants and with the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council." 6
The Commission has often linked the development of the
internal market with a need to communicate more effectively
with citizens and to ensure its responsiveness to consumers'
interests. However, as a practical matter, financial firms, and
especially large financial firms, are in a better position than
ther, developing normative mechanisms which are not only flexible enough to
accommodate the emerging, pluralist and essentially "self-defining" EU polity,
but which also ensure that the pluralist process of internal market manage-
ment is not simply a matter of the dominance of the strongest interest.
Id.
84. The Lamfalussy Report itself acknowledged this issue:
The European Commission alone has the right of initiative under the Treaty.
However the Committee recommends that in the future, before the Commis-
sion draws up a proposal in these areas, it should take the following steps: 1.
Consult, beforehand, in an open, transparent and systematic way with market
participants and end-users (issuers and consumers). Deadlines should be set
and made clear. Where necessary, open hearings should be held. There
should be a strengthened and open dialogue with market participants and
end-users so as to advise the Commission on a continuous basis on Level 1
work. Use of the Internet should be used to encourage more participation. A
summary of the consultation process undertaken should be made available
when the final proposal is made.
LAMFALUSSY REPORT, supra note 20, at 25.
85. Council Directive No. 2005/I/EC, O.J. L 79/9, at recital no. 6 (2005) (amend-
ing Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC, 92/49/EEC and 93/
6/EEC and Directives 94/19/EC, 98/78/EC, 2000/12/EC, 2001/34/EC, 2002/83/EC
and 2002/87/EC in order to establish a new organizational structure for financial ser-
vices committees).
86. Id. at recital no. 19.
87. See, e.g., Strategy for Europe's Internal Market, supra note 46, at 4.
The Internal Market is not an end in itself. The benefits of improved eco-
nomic performance must be distributed equitably between all Member States
and among all sections of society. Tangible benefits for citizens and consum-
ers-safe and high quality food, products and services; better choice and
lower prices-must be seen to be amongst the benefits of Internal Market
policies. Policy makers-at both European and national level-therefore
need to become ever more responsive to the views of those they serve. To
achieve this, the Dialogue with Citizens and Business promises new ways (In-
ternet and e-mail) of improving the interactive nature of policy development.
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consumers to find out about rule-making proposals and to
communicate their views.8 ' Financial firms act collectively in re-
sponding to rule-making proposals through their trade associa-
89tions.
The Commission has taken a number of steps to encourage
consumers to participate in the rule-making process. For exam-
ple, the Commission publishes consultation documents on pro-
posed directives and invites comments from the public.9" The
Commission initiated consideration for a revision of the Invest-
ment Services Directive in 2000 with a Communication.91 The
Communication noted that the harmonization of conduct of
business rules had implications for retail investors.92 However, a
88. See, e.g., Mfigge, supra note 39, at 1001 ("Members of clearly circumscribed
policy communities sit at the table whereas other stakeholders do not."); cf Director-
General Holmquist, European Commission, Speech at a Meeting of the Social Economy
Intergroup Session (Sept. 12, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/
speeches/docs/2007/jhl2092007.pdf ("Although the Commission's increasing practice
of conducting consultations is appreciated, some-for instance trade unions and con-
sumers-do not feel sufficiently involved in what we do."). See generally Commission of
the European Communities, Communication from the Commission: European Gov-
ernance: Better Lawmaking, COM (2002) 275 Final, at 3 (June 2002) ("Are the small-
est voices really and always heard?").
89. I have focused on the role of financial trade associations as actors in multi-level
governance of financial services in Caroline Bradley, Financial Trade Associations and
Multilevel Regulation, in MULTILEVEL REGULATION AND THE EU (Ramses Wessel, Andreas
Follesdal &Jan Wouters eds., forthcoming 2008). A version of this paper is available at
http://blenderlaw.umlaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2007/07/bradleymultilevel-
003.pdf. In this paper I argue that consumers and the organizations which represent
their interests are more likely than financial firms to be excluded from effective partici-
pation in supranational standard-setting due to the combined effects of opaque
processes, framing, and lack of resources.
90. On consultation in the EU, see Commission of the European Communities,
Communication from the Commission: Towards a reinforced culture of consultation
and dialogue-General principles and minimum standards for consultation of inter-
ested parties by the Commission, COM (2002) 704 Final (Dec. 2002).
91. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Upgrading the Investment
Services Directive (93/22/EEC), COM (2000) 729 Final (Nov. 2000).
92. See id. at 10.
As regards retail investors, the transition to home country supervision of invest-
ment services will need to be carefully managed. It is currently the case that
host country authorities may have a comparative advantage as a first-line of
defence in detecting and initiating action against firms which transgress in
their dealings with retail investors. Moreover, conduct of business rules in the
different Member States cannot be assumed to offer comparable protection to
retail investors. Consequently, retail investors may derive benefit and confi-
dence from the possibility of seeking redress within their own jurisdiction.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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subsequent consultation produced sixty-nine responses to the
"preliminary orientations,"93 almost all of which came from mar-
ket participants and regulators. The Commission described the
author of only one of these comments as being from the "share-
holder/investor" constituency.94 The respondents did comment
on the distinction between professional and retail investors,95
and on the question whether transactions on behalf of execu-
tion-only customers should be subject to suitability require-
ments. 6 These issues are both relevant to consumers' interests,
and it is clear that financial firms might have different views
about the appropriate rules from those of consumers,97 yet, at
this early stage in the development of MiFID,9 s no consumer
groups seem to have been involved.
This is one example of a more general phenomenon: con-
sumers have not taken advantage of all of the available opportu-
nities to comment on proposals for rules which will affect their
interests. Merely making consultation documents publicly avail-
able does not ensure responses from consumers. The Commis-
sion has taken positive steps to build consumer participation
into its work. For example, in 2004, the Commission established
the Forum of User Experts in the Area of Financial Services
("FIN-USE") to ensure that the views of consumers and small
businesses were reflected in EU policy-making,99 and in 2006
93. REVISION OF THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECrIVE (93/22/EEC): SUMMARY OF
RESPONSES TO THE PRELIMINARY ORIENTATIONS OF COMMISSION SERVICES Annex 2, 3
(2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/securities/docs/isd/2001-07-
summ-responses.pdf.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 18.
96. Id. at 21.
97. Cf Mfigge, supra note 39, at 1002.
Some market players will find application of an epistemic community's ortho-
doxy inherently advantageous, for example because it highlights transparency
or market opening. On the continuum between technocratic and political
oversight, we should expect these firms to call for the former whereas those
disadvantaged by dominant thinking support the latter. Rather than removing
policy fields from politics, technocratization is itself highly political.
Id.
98. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., FIN-USE EXPERT FORUM OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, FIN-USE ANNUAL RE-
PORT 2004/5, at 2 (2005) ("FIN-USE was set-up by the European Commission in 2004 as
an independent expert forum to help meet the pressing need to improve policy-making
in the field of financial services through a more structured dialogue with consumers
and small business in the European Union.").
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the Commission established a Financial Services Consumer
Group.100
FIN-USE has expressed a lack of comfort with pre-emption
of national discretion in financial regulation. 10 1 In its comment
on the Green Paper on Retail Financial Services, FIN-USE ar-
gued against maximum harmonization for retail financial ser-
vices, 10 2 and that "the appropriateness and effectiveness of 'prin-
ciples-based' or light-touch prudential regulation needs to be ur-
gently reviewed. 1 0 3 There is a dramatic contrast between FIN-
USE's skepticism about harmonized financial regulation and the
financial services industry's condemnation of gold-plating. If the
lines between the wholesale and retail markets were clear, 0 4 it
would be easier to delimit cases where maximum harmonization
were desirable, but FIN-USE suggests that it does not see such
100. See Commission Press Release, Financial Services: Commission hosts first
meeting of Financial Services Consumer Group, IP/06/806 (June 20, 2006).
101. See, e.g., FIN-USE, RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION'S INTERIM REPORT II REGARD-
ING THE SECTOR INQUIRY ON RETAIL BANKING, MORE SPECIFICALLY CURRENT ACCOUNTS
AND RELATED SERVICES 2 (2006).
FIN-USE believes that these laws, developed over many years and reflective of
the diverse cultures that make up the EU, should not be lightly dismissed.
Instead, an empirical case must be made for why the potential benefits of a
bigger market outweigh the costs of doing away with existing consumer pro-
tection laws. To our experience, these laws not only protect the most vulnera-
ble members of our society, but are also vital to the sustainability of the politi-
cal and economic structures of the EU.
Id.
102. See FIN-USE, EXPERT FORUM OF FIN. SERVS., RESPONSE TO THE GREEN PAPER ON
RETAIL FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE SINGLE MARKET 1 (2007), available at http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/ internal market/finservices-retail/ docs/ policy/gp_comments/ other eu_
finuseen.pdf.
[T]he adoption of the maximum harmonisation approach in the retail finan-
cial services market is limited in its application. It is important that the Com-
mission commits to ensuring that robust and consistent minimum standards
exist in relation to: the provision of information; quality of financial advice;
regulation, legal protection and redress; and professional standards.
Id.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Cf id. at 19:
[T]here are concerns about the developing risks in credit markets. In particu-
lar, cross-border selling or assignment of credit portfolios (credit claims, per-
forming loans as well as non-performing loans) by part of the credit industry
to credit investment/private equity companies raises concerns in the context
of BASEL II and general prudential regulation. It is not clear if the risks are
being shifted to an area which is not sufficiently supervised. This could have
implications for consumer protection.
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clear distinctions. FIN-USE's examples of potential problems
with light touch regulation include "recent crises in the sub-
prime market, credit markets and hedge fund/private equity sec-
tors."' 05
FIN-USE has argued that a number of factors affect the abil-
ity of consumer organizations to participate in the rule-making
process on an equal footing with representatives of the financial
services industry. These factors are the different levels of re-
sources available to the different groups, short time frames for
consultation, the way in which consultation documents are
drafted (for example do they contain jargon) and whether con-
sultations are carried out only in English.1
0 6
The establishment of FIN-USE illustrates the Commission's
efforts to include consumers in the development of financial ser-
vices policy. However, the specialized financial services commit-
tees, concentrating on the technical aspects of their work, have
been less interested in consumer views and have focused on con-
sulting market participants. The Committee of European Secur-
ities Regulators ("CESR"),107 has a Market Participants Consulta-
tive Panel,'0 but it does not have a consultative panel for con-
sumers. In 2005, CESR did hold a meeting with consumer
groups to focus on MiFID.' °9 CESR's summary of the meeting
stated:
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id. at 23.
107. See, e.g., Moloney, supra note 36, at 814 (noting that Committee of European
Securities Regulators is a reincarnation of the Forum on European Securities Commis-
sions ("FESCO"), which has worked on financial market harmonization since 1997); see
also COMM. OF EUR. SEC. REGULATORS, CHARTER OF THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN SECURI-
TIES REGULATORS, art. 5.11 (2006), available at http://blenderlaw.umlaw.net/wp-con-
ten t/uploads/ 2008/02/ charter2006.pdf.
The Committee will use the appropriate processes to consult (both ex-ante
and ex-post) market participants, consumers and end users which may include
inter alia: concept releases, consultative papers, public hearings and roundt-
ables, written and Internet consultations, public disclosure and summary of
comments, national and/or European focused consultations. The Committee
will make a public statement of its consultation practices.
Id.
108. See, e.g., Moloney, supra note 36, at 826 (stating that "CESR's Market Partici-
pants Group ... which forms a core element of its market consultation mechanism, is
dominated by wholesale-market interests").
109. See COMM. OF EUR. SEC. REGULATORS, MiFID CONSUMER DAY-22 MARCH 2005,
ISSUES ON REGULATION OF INTERMEDIARIES AND MARKETS UNDER MiFID, SUMMARY OF THE
MAIN CONCLUSIONS 1 (2005), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/popup2.php?id=3297.
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The importance CESR attaches to receiving comments on its
advice from representatives of retail clients and consumers
was stressed and CESR expressed its concern that the re-
sponses received to previous consultations carried out on
MiFID, had not reflected sufficiently this set of stakeholders.
CESR made it known that it intended to organise similar
meetings in the future to continue and develop this dialogue
further.1 10
At the meeting in 2005, consumer representatives raised
some of the issues FIN-USE has noted about their lack of re-
sources, and about the desirability of multi-lingual consulta-
tion."1 As of early 2008, CESR appears only to consult in En-
glish, and does not appear to have held more similar meetings
with consumers, although CESR has advertised for a Communi-
cations Officer, whose job would include "[a]ssisting as needed
with the CESR Consumer Task force: developing and editing
material targeted to retail investors."1 12 Groups which focus on
consumers' interests have participated in CESR's consultations.
In its response to a consultation on simplified prospectuses for
retail investors, the Associazione Consumatori Utenti wrote: "we
are convinced that the best solution for all parties involved can
be easier reached if the consultation with consumers associations
become less occasional and more systematic."' 1 3
The Committee of European Banking Supervisors
("CEBS"), which was formed more recently than CESR, has a
consultative committee which includes two members of FIN-
USE, Riccardo de Lisa and BenoitJolivet, and Manfred Westphal
of the European Consumers' Organisation ("BEUC")."4 CEBS
has stated that in its consultations it will generally "[t]arget the
full range of interested parties, including market participants
(e.g. credit institutions, investment firms, etc), consumers, other
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. COMM. OF EUR. SEC. REGULATORS, JOB DESCRIFriON: COMMUNICATIONS OF-
FICER (2008), available at http://blenderlaw.umlaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/
cesradvert.pdf.
113. Associazione Consumatori Utenti ("ACU"), Questionaire on Simplified Pro-
spectus For Retail Investors (May 31, 2007), available at http://blenderlaw.umlaw.net/
wp-content/uploads/2008/02/acu.pdf.
114. See Comm. of Eur. Bank Supervisors ("CEBS"), Consultative Panel-Members,
http://www.c-ebs.org/ConsultativePanelmembers.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
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end-users as well as their representative associations."" 5 How-
ever, market participants have shown that they feel they should
have preferential access to policy-making in the banking context.
When the CEBS proposed amendments to its consultation prac-
tices in 2007, the British Bankers Association responded by invit-
ing the CEBS to hold informal roundtables with market partici-
pants before launching formal consultations, suggesting that the
CEBS consultative panel was not always sufficiently informed
about the needs of the market." 6 A joint submission by the
London Investment Banking Association, the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association, the Swedish Securities Deal-
ers Association and the Finnish Association of Securities Dealers
made a similar point:
We would encourage CEBS in the strongest possible terms to
build on its informal mechanisms as much as on its formal
procedures. Transparency of thinking at an early stage is one
of the most powerful tools in' achieving proposals that work
well for all parties. Secondly we also ask CEBS to consider,
when embarking on any stream of work, whether the Consult-
ative Panel is as fully and as widely representative as it needs
to be for that specific issue and to identify ways in which in-
dustry experience and input can be supplemented. Informal
hearings are a good mechanism -providing that there is some
structure and industry has a clear view of the kinds of issues
115. CEBS, PUBLIC STATEMENT OF CONSULTATION PRACTICES (2005), available at
http://www.c-ebs.org/Consultation-papers/CPOI1final.pdf.
116. Letter from Alex Merriman, Director, Wholesale & Regulation, British Bank-
ers Association, to Andrea Enria, Secretary-General, Committee of European Banking
Supervisors, on Amendments to CEBS Consultation Paper (CP 01Rev) to its Consulta-
tion Practices (June 18, 2007), available at http://www.c-ebs.org/Consultation-papers/
documents/BBACPOlrev.pdf.
We would also suggest that CEBS considers, prior to the launching of formal
consultation, a further refinement of its practices. This would be the holding
of ad hoc roundtables with market practitioners, ahead of the launch of a formal
consultation.
The purpose of these would be to obtain specific technical observations on a
particular issue from a wide range of market participants, in an informal, but
transparent way. This would then in turn inform CEBS Members ahead of
themselves developing a view about a particular issue. We recognise that the
Consultative Panel already undertakes an important role in relation to input-
ting market feedback into CEBS, but we are not entirely convinced that this is
always sufficiently focussed on ensuring that a complete and well-considered
market view prevails. The BBA has substantial experience of organising these
industry roundtables and we can assist CEBS in their development.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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on which CEBS wishes to understand their attitudes." 17
I have argued before that one of the major advantages fi-
nancial trade associations have in multi-level regulation gener-
ally is that of framing and agenda-setting.' 18
A more detailed empirical review of the structure and con-
tent of the financial services committees' consultation practices
and relations with market and consumer groups is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, this sketch of the consultation
landscape does demonstrate some of the process-related difficul-
ties that Europe faces in moving forward with harmonization of
financial regulation at this point.
CONCLUSION
After fifty years, the European market is still a work in pro-
gress. The citizen as consumer is at the heart of the internal
market. However, the retail financial services market in Europe
is not fully integrated, and consumers do not benefit as much as
they might from competition between different financial services
providers. 19 Attempts to increase the level of retail market inte-
gration face some hurdles, however, as consumer groups and fi-
nancial trade associations have different views on what quantity
and what varieties of harmonization are desirable. Consumer
groups and trade associations disagree even about the manage-
ment of the process of rule-making. The difficulty of resolving
the tensions between the views of consumer groups and financial
firms in the context of financial services policy raises real ques-
tions about the potential of functional participation to legitimate
European rule-making in this area.
117. CEBS, COMMENTS TO CEBS (2007), available at http://www.c-ebs.org/Consul-
tation papers/documents/LIBAISDASSDAFASDCPOI rev.pdf.
118. See generally Bradley, supra note 89.
119. See generally Commission of the European Communities, Communication
from the Commission: Sector Inquiry Under Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
on Retail Banking (Final Report), COM (2007) 33 Final (Jan. 31, 2007).
1234
